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How to release the response from the actual situation – Zhu Xi’s Confucian solution plan I found a sluggish little guy in the branches.
Author: Huang Yong (Teacher from the Department of Chinese Philosophy in Drumbi Hong Kong)
Translator: Duan Suge (Associate Researcher at the Institute of Ethics, Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences)
Source: “My Character and Civilization” 2018 Issue 1
Time: Confucius was the 21st year of Wuxu Puyue Dingyou
Jesus July 4, 2018
In a famous passage in Humane Discourse, Big Hugh declared that there is a grand drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic drastic d To put it bluntly, they are two complete disagreements, and they cannot be published as a despicable statement from a realistic statement. Later, G.E. Morr proposed the concept of “naturalistic fallacy” in “Theory of Ethics”, which is considered to mean “the is a ‘risky’ of issuing a ‘risky’ from a realistic statement”. For example, Charles R. Pigden claims that people make the mistake of issuing “should” from “yes” not because morality has any particular characteristics, but because of the old nature of logic – meaning that “the conclusions that comply with legal reasoning are included in the conditions. You cannot take out something you have not put in before” [2].
In this article, I will first evaluate two formalistic trials from realistic statements and confess why they are not profitable. Then I will discuss the virtue ethics of contemporary Aristotleianism, go. Rosalind Hursthouse, in particular, did a more realistic trial. I think the purpose of this trial is correct. Its problem is important in “yes” rather than “responsible”: because the descriptive and realistic statement is problematic, it becomes problematic with the standardized statements published from it. So at the end of the article, I will give an assessment of Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism trial. From the ordinary structure of nature it is similar to the Neo-Aristotle’s theory of trial, but its starting point is the sameA realistic statement of differences. I will prove that this Neo-Confucian trial is more capable of winning.
1. Narrative and Serr’s sentimental trial
The question raised by Moore seems to be clear in a clear way, so people have a doubt about any attempt to publish appropriate statements from realistic statements. Despite this, people often try this kind of trial. In this session, I will conduct an assessment of two such trials to express why they are not profitable. I started with Mark T.Nelson’s certificate—a time that is more recent but less known. Nauro proposed the following proof of the hypocrisy [3]:
N1. “From the moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline” is one of Aunt Dali’s confidence;
N2. All Aunt Dali’s confidence is true;
N3. Therefore, from the moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline.
This is obviously a useful evidence, but does this evidence really issue a sensible statement from a factual statement? Obviously, the conclusion of the statement below is a sensible statement, and the first condition is a sensible statement. The second condition is also a factual statement; but if we say “Auntie Dali’s faith is true”, then this confidence of Auntie Dali’s “from a moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline” is the same; but it is true to say that Auntie Dali’s faith “from a moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline” is the true statement, but it only means “from a moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline” – this is a supposed statement. Therefore, what Naurent realizes is not a sensible statement from a factual statement, but a sensible statement from a sensible statement.
In response to our opposition, Nargo made a division between the specific explanation of the second condition and the general explanation. According to a special explanation, the second condition is indeed “included with a list, including all Aunt Dali’s faith and the true words of every confidence” [3](559). Since this list also contains Aunt Daliya’s confidence that “Berty should marry Madeline from a moral point of view” and other obligatory confidence, the second condition is not a purely descriptive statement. However, Nauro declares that the second condition can also be interpreted as a common explanation, “that is, the explanation is that all Auntie Dali’s faith—regardless of what it is—is true, or perhaps it is better: Auntie Dali is absolutely false, and this explanation does not contain moral promises…The special explanation of N2 has a ‘Berty’s meaningful marriage to Madeline’Virtue promises, but the explanation of its common nature does not contain such a moral promise. In addition, my proof is in The harness pipeline is still useful for the generality explanation of N2, and what I mean is this ordinary explanation”[3](559). The problems in Naergo’s argument are double. On the one hand, he did not tell us why it is the same as a special explanation. In the case of this, a general explanation of the second condition must be made. On the other hand, if the general explanation can be accepted, the logical proof of moral confidence and other moral sentiments (because moral confidence is just a manifestation of emotion) can be considered that the Narnor’s argument is invalid because the second condition does not include such a Dali Auntie “From a moral perspective, Bertie should marry Madeline”, so we cannot conclude that Bertie should marry Madeline from a moral perspective, even if all the confidence of Aunt Dali is true. In this case, Nall has to confess to the moral sentimentists that there is moral confidence and that such confidence is also included in the second condition. However, even if the relationship is The debaters were convinced that they would also recognize that Naarvod did not publish a destiny from a factual statement, because the second condition is (at most parts) a destiny.
Now I am turning to another earlier and more famous trial. In his classic article “How to publish “destiny” from “is”?”, published in 1964 In Deriving “Ought” from “Is”?), John R.Searle directly attacked the “Doubt” issue. He believed that the “Doubt” means: “There is a kind of factual statement that differs from the value statement in logic. No set of factual statements can singlely lead to any value statement. To put it in more contemporary language, if there is no verbal statement that can lead to a verbal statement without at least one valuation condition. ”[4]Ser designed the following counterexample to counter the hypocrisy [4](44):
(1) Zhas said, “I promise No. 5 dollars to pay Mime Shi’s daughter”;
(2) Zhas would pay Mime Shi’s daughter $5;
(3) Zhas put himself under the obligation to pay Mime Shi’s daughter $5;
(4) Zans has the right to pay Mime Shin;
(5) Zans should pay Mime Shin.
Sher claims that in this example, the first sentence as a condition is obviously a descriptive statement, while the second sentence is just a restatement of the first condition, the third sentence is just a dictionary explanation of the word “Hunor”, and the fourthA sentence is a retelling of the third sentence. From this, the fifth sentence as a conclusion seems to be logically derived from the fourth sentence – a supposed statement.
Ser’s article was published, causing heated discussions on whether this counterexample could be useful. My doubts are slightly different. I do not doubt the usefulness of this counterexample, I doubt whether it can actually publish a despicable statement from that factual statement. In explaining his counterexample, Serr declared that the Husband’s proposition was based on a concept of “descriptive statement”. The so-called “descriptive statement” refers to some statements such as “My car can run 80 miles in an hour”, “Jense is 6 feet tall”, and “Miss Shi’s head is brown”. But Thur believes there is a very different descriptive statement, such as “Jense is married”, “Miss Shi made a Mayo”, “Jack Tomorrow has $5”, and “Brown hit a record of the blow.” How do they differ? Ser said:
Even if the objects of these t
